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Abstract: This paper suggests the major educational components of a curriculum that is 
designed to educate individuals for job assignments as Information Assurance 
professionals - also known as: cyber warriors. It suggests a minimum common 
body of knowledge for all cyber warriors along with two major specialization 
categories: cyber tacticians and cyber strategists. The paper describes the 
distinction between tactician and strategist and offers a rough outline of the 
education each should receive. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Though the wide scale interconnection of automated information 
systems (e.g., the Internet) has been a boon to U.S. military and economic 
power, it also presents a soft underbelly to present and future adversaries. 
U.S. reliance upon the ever-expanding National Information Infrastructure, 
in conjunction with an increasingly wired world, exacerbates the U.S. 's 
vulnerability to cyber threats. Sensitive information could once be protected 
using relatively easily understood physical, personnel, and communications 
security mechanisms. The advent of interconnected automated systems now 
requires that such information receive the additional protections afforded by 
computer and network security mechanisms. The education of individuals to 
understand the complexities inherent in such mechanisms, so that they can 
effectively implement them is the central theme of this paper. 
It is natural to invoke military principles and terminology to discuss 
elements of this new era of increased cyber vulnerability. Though those 
involved may not wear uniforms, or fight along linear geographic 
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boundaries; there is clearly a high stakes adversarial environment that is 
conducive to well understood military conceptualization. Therefore we have 
such analogies as: de-militarized zones (moderately protected public service 
networks), security perimeters (boundaries between different data risk 
levels), and cyber warriors (IA professionals). This paper suggests an 
education regimen for cyber warriors, and suggests that these warriors be 
divided into two categories: cyber tacticians and cyber strategists. Cyber 
tacticians would focus on reducing the risk of existing fielded systems 
primarily through the application o'f appropriate safeguards (e.g., firewalls, 
intrusion detection, redundant configurations, data backups, etc.). Cyber 
strategists would focus on reducing the risk of future systems primarily 
through the application of structured and formal system design techniques 
that reduce system vulnerabilities. 
2. BOOT CAMP: TEACHING THE 
FUNDAMENTALS 
Cyber tacticians and cyber strategists should both receive the same 
basic core education. We can refer to this as cyber boot camp in keeping 
with the military analogy. Cyber boot camp should address all of the core 
subject matter encountered in modern information systems, and do so in a 
bottom-up order. Cyber boot camp should also introduce the core principles 
of information assurance. 
2.1 Subject Matter Ordering 
The minimum set of core subject matter courses I suggest are: 1) 
Discrete Mathematics, 2) Computer Hardware/Architecture, 3) 
Programming, 4) Operating Systems, and 5) Algorithms. These choices will 
be elaborated upon below. By bottom-up order, I suggest introducing the 
courses in the order presented above while allowing that Programming and 
Operating Systems may be presented in any order due to their logical 
interdependency. Teaching these courses in the order suggested should 
reduce much of the confusion often experienced by novice students who find 
themselves working with an abstract logical concept (e.g., pointers) before 
they have seen the underlying physical level implementation (e.g., a 32 bit 
address indicating a physical memory location). Upon completion of this 
course of study, students should have a clear understanding of the problem-
to-solution process in its entirety. That is; real-world problem statement -7 
algorithm to solve it -7 program to implement the algorithm -7 operating 
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system that will load, schedule, and allocate resources for the program ~ 
hardware that electrically executes the instruction-cycle and runs the loaded 
program that solves the problem. And this entire process can be conceptually 
described or modeled with the most basic layer, i.e., Discrete Mathematics. 
Throughout the presentation of these five core courses, we also introduce the 
students to the core principles of information assurance that are described in 
section 2.3. 
2.2 Subject Matter: Courses 
Cyber warriors should begin with the solid conceptual understanding that 
computers are ultimately nothing but physical structures that provide a 
means for mathematics to be brought to corporeal life. For example, 
numbers translate into; pixilated screen images, hard drive armature 
displacements, pointer offsets, IP address masks, etc. Discrete Mathematics 
provides the descriptive tools necessary to discuss, define, design, and 
analyze the behavior of computer hardware and software. It is the logical 
starting place for the study of information processing systems, and provides 
the necessary tools for describil1g system design and functionality. 
Next in the sequence is computer hardware and architectural design. At 
this layer students learn about the binary switch (transistor) that is at the 
"atomic level" of computer processors. They learn about logic gates that 
realize Boolean relationships that make the controlled movement and 
manipulation of digital data possible. They are introduced to combinational 
circuits, storage devices, encoders, decoders, multiplexers and the other 
basic digital building block components. The capstone instruction in this 
course should consist of a demonstration of how a high level language code 
fragment must be converted to machine code that is supported by the 
underlying target hardware's instruction set; followed by a clock-cycle-by-
clock-cycle analysis of what happens as the hardware processes each fetched 
instruction from memory. 
We follow the hardware layer with a course in either Operating Systems 
(OS) or a contemporary programming language. On the one hand, ass are 
programs, thus we would expect programming to precede the as course. On 
the other hand, application programs rely upon an appropriate as 
environment upon which to run. This classic "chicken or egg" relationship 
should not be a major point of contention as it pertains to the quality of our 
cyber warrior curriculum. As indicated above, I suggest that instruction in 
programming follow directly behind the hardware course. This allows 
students to immediately "use" their newly understood knowledge of 
hardware by writing instructions that will ultimately run on it. 
264 Training the Cyber Warrior 
With the rudiments of hardware, and software design understood, we 
should next instruct our students in the features and functionalities of 
operating systems (OS). Students come to understand the central role that the 
as plays in choreographing the interaction between special purpose 
application programs and the host platform (hardware) it is being run on. It 
is also at this point that our students should begin to see how a well designed 
as can playa crucial role in a cyber defense strategy via such mechanisms 
as: file system support for access control, subject/object labeling, locking 
mechanisms, security domains, and segmentation. 
We finish the coursework with our students being indoctrinated into the 
world of complex problem solving with a course in advanced algorithms. 
Students learn that size and speed matter in computer systems just as they do 
on the battlefield. They also obtain enhanced understanding of the 
complexity of the myriad protocols employed to bind systems in an inter-
operative networked environment. Our cyber warriors are now mentally 
armed to scrutinize the complexities of such topics as: key space search 
efficiency, path finding, tree pruning, shortest path determination, signature 
matching, etc. 
2.3 Core Principles of Information Assurance 
Throughout boot camp we inculcate the students with the seminal 
concepts in information assurance methodology. Though many concepts, 
principles, models or theoretical postulations may legitimately vie for 
inclusion in this category, I suggest the following four as an absolute must: 
the Reference Monitor Concept, the Risk Management Equation, the 
Defense-in-Depth paradigm, and the Principle of Least Privilege. The 
Reference Monitor Concept is at the heart of virtually every technical 
mechanism (hardware or software) that has ever been devised for the 
purpose of enhancing the security of information. The Risk Management 
Equation provides a high level management framework by which cyber 
warriors can organize and allocate their defensive efforts. Defense-in-Depth 
dictates not putting all of one's security eggs in one basket, but instead 
employing multiple, sometimes overlapping, layers of complementary 
security solutions. The Principle of Least Privilege enjoins all who develop 
or configure security-relevant attributes of systems to allow no more access 
to information or computing resources than is absolutely necessary to 
accomplish each legitimate (i.e., non policy violating) task. 
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2.3.1 The Reference Monitor Concept 
The Reference Monitor (RM) Concept, first introduced in the "Anderson 
Report" [1], provides the most basic and essential technical framework for 
any information assurance solution. I will make no attempt at a complete 
description here, but I will offer a synopsis that highlights the importance of 
this concept to the proper education of the cyber warrior. 
The concept maintains that access control is at the heart of data 
protection. An access request is defined as a subject (person or process) 
attempting to read or modify an object (logical unit of data). The RM is the 
mechanism that arbitrates such requests, and does so based upon one or more 
identifiable or otherwise measurable attributes associated with each subject 
and object. The actual access control policy that a given RM implements is 
determined by the relationship of the subject and object attributes and the 
rules that the RM enforces over these relationships. A more thorough 
examination of this concept can be found in "The Reference Monitor 
Concept as a Unifying Principle in Computer Security Education" [2]. 
2.3.2 The Risk Management Equation 
The Risk Management Equation gives the cyber warrior a big picture 
management perspective over the extensive problem domain of IA. The 
equation is derived from the generally accepted notion that safeguards 
applied to mitigate initial risk will reduce that risk to some degree, resulting 
in residual risk. This can be expressed relationally as: zero risk <= residual 
risk < initial risk, and from that the more general relationship is shown: 
Residual Risk = Risk - Safeguards 
Then, applying the notion put forth by Brinkley and Schell [3], we can 
substitute the product of threats and vulnerabilities (abbreviated "Vulns" 
below) for risk, to achieve the final risk management equation. 
Residual Risk = (Threats x Vulns) - Safeguards 
When explaining this equation, students must be informed that merely 
defining information as the subject of this equation yields insufficient 
granularity. Instead, students learn that there are ultimately four attributes of 
information that are potentially of interest to protect: confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity, and availability. These attributes are so central to IA 
that we exhort our warriors to always be mindful of these four attributes 
when investigating any given IA question. We should refer to these 
attributes so often that the acronym CIAA becomes part of the cyber 
warrior's lexicon. Note that while some IA practitioners recommend adding 
non-repudiation to the list of protected information attributes, I recommend 
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omitting it as it is essentially a byproduct of sufficiently implemented 
authenticity along with integrity of a one or more attendant timestamps. 
Now that our students understand that the Risk Management Equation can 
be defined collectively over all information attributes, or more precisely, 
over any of the four specific information attributes, we can proceed to 
discussion of the equation's individual terms and their relationship. 
The threat vulnerability product is somewhat intuitive, but deserves a 
brief explanation for our novice students. Threats indicate malicious intent to 
attack one or more of the four information attributes. Brinkley and Schell [3] 
describe six such threats: human error, abuse of privilege, direct probing, 
probing with malicious software, direct penetration, and subversion of 
security mechanism. Vulnerabilities indicate design flaws in the security 
mechanisms of a system. The product of threats and vulnerabilities is 
equivalent to risk. Expressing risk as the product of threats and 
vulnerabilities captures the logical conclusion that risk does not exist for 
systems that have no vulnerabilities, and conversely, that the lack of any 
threats poses no risk no matter how many vulnerabilities a system may have. 
Increasing or decreasing either of the two product terms yields a 
corresponding increase or decrease in risk. To mitigate risk we apply 
safeguards, which if effective, should reduce the risk by some amount 
leaving us with residual risk. Since it is generally considered infeasible to 
achieve a zero residual risk environment, our cyber warriors are taught that 
their broad mission is to manage the equations' three dependent variables 
(threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards) in such a way as to reduce residual 
risk to an economically (or militarily) acceptable level. This understanding 
yields a simple big picture IA management matrix. 
Vulnerabilities Safeguards 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
Availability 
This matrix identifies twelve areas of concern to the cyber warrior. We can 
teach this as a mental model that the cyber warriors can use in their daily 
routine. For example, cyber warriors make the checking of new vulnerability 
alerts (e.g., CERT advisories) a part of their daily routine. As new 
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vulnerabilities are discovered and announced, they are quick to assess which 
attribute(s) of information the vulnerability applies to, and what the resulting 
impact will be on the residual risk of information under their protection. 
Likewise, these cyber warriors will monitor developments among IA 
vendors for improved safeguards, ready to investigate and perhaps 
recommend for purchase any products that promise a reduced residual risk 
return on investment. 
2.3.3 Defense-in-depth 
This core principle dictates that practitioners of IA should not rely on 
any single device, technology, or security area (e.g., personnel security, 
physical security, etc.) when working to minimize system risks. Practitioners 
should instead seek to bolster system defenses by incorporating multiple 
devices, technologies, and security areas in a synergistic and mutually 
supportive manner. The new Department of Defense Directive on 
Information Assurance [4] emphasizes the importance of this core principle 
by addressing it in its very first paragraph: 
1.1. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities under reference (a) to 
achieve Department of Defense (000) information assurance (IA) 
through a defense-in-depth approach that integrates the capabilities of 
personnel, operations, and technology, and supports the evolution of 
network centric warfare. 
The 000 IA Directive also provides a definition for this core principle: 
E2.1.11. Defense-in-Depth. The DoD approach for establishing an 
adequate IA posture in a shared-risk environment that allows for shared 
mitigation through: the integration of people, technology, and operations; 
the layering of IA solutions within and among IT assets; and the selection 
of IA solutions based on their relative level of robustness. 
We should emphasize the importance of defense-in-depth with case 
studies where a seemingly sufficient single layer defense proved insufficient. 
We should stress to the fledgling cyber warriors the extreme skill and 
resolve that some attackers will bring to bear in a concerted assault, and the 
value that a layered defense-in-depth approach provides in countering such 
attackers. 
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2.3.4 Principle of Least Privilege 
The Principle of Least Privilege is the more all encompassing principle 
that borrows directly from the intelligence community's institutionalized 
"need to know" personnel security principle. The idea is that sensitive 
information should receive no more exposure to potential disclosure or 
modification risk than which is absolutely necessary for mission 
accomplishment. Cyber warriors should be taught to employ the least 
privilege principle to the maximum extent practical; including: user account 
privileges, listening ports on servers, ICMP response messages (e.g., no 
response to echo request or requests for subnet mask information), and 
firewall permit rules, to name a few instances. Least privilege is equally 
applicable in software design where, for example, we would expect the 
operating system to restrict a given module's instruction space (i.e., 
branching) to that module's assigned/allocated memory segment; or via the 
use of "friend" class relationships in object-oriented programming to restrict 
illicit or otherwise erroneous inter-object message passing (member function 
calls). 
3. TWO CATEGORIES OF CYBER WARRIORS 
Though it is possible to educate all cyber warriors the same, the 
breadth of the IA problem domain coupled with economic realities suggest 
specialization should be more granular. I suggest that the two top-level 
categories be: cyber tactician, and cyber strategist. The military analogy is 
strong here but not exact. Cyber tacticians focus on reducing residual risk 
predominantly with the application of safeguards, while cyber strategists 
focus on reducing residual risk by reducing system vulnerabilities. The skill 
set for each of these risk mitigation solutions is sufficiently different and 
complex to warrant specialization. 
3.1 Cyber Tacticians 
Basically, cyber tacticians should be educated to protect the systems 
that are fielded now. Due to economic forces and improperly educated or 
motivated programmers, computer systems will be fielded with 
vulnerabilities that run the gamut of type and severity. Since history gives us 
no hint that threats are subsiding, the risk management equation tells us that 
these systems are at risk and that the application of safeguards is the only in-
field means of risk mitigation. 
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We should educate the cyber tacticians to become experts in the utility, 
application and effectiveness of safeguards. An exhaustive list of safeguards 
is not attempted here, but the broad categories of safeguard tools and 
technology are. 
First on this list is the important though mundane category of secure 
standard operating procedures and user training. This category covers such 
items as: password selection and usage, un-attended log-ons, potentially 
malicious e-mail attachments, the importance of anti-virus signature updates, 
social engineering attacks, portable PC security, etc. 
Second is data backup technology and policy. The efficacy of this 
safeguard category is widely known, but the confusion encountered by the 
multitude of media (e.g., tape, disk, CD-R/RW, DVD+R/RW/RAM) and 
backup techniques (e.g., full, incremental, differential, RAID levels 1-5, 
compression, etc.) dissuade many well intentioned users from making it a 
part of their routine data security habits. Cyber tacticians should maintain 
mastery of this extremely important recovery safeguard technology, and 
ensure that a backup policy is created and implemented for all valuable data 
under their purview. 
Cyber tacticians should be well versed in the "principle of least 
privilege" as it pertains to all aspects of infonnation security. This principle 
should permeate every configurable software setting and every access 
control decision. Cyber tacticians should know that vendors often practice 
the "principle of most privilege" as their out-of-the-box default 
configurations, including generic root log ins and passwords. A regular and 
concerted effort to ensure that a least privilege policy is enforced system-
wide should be heavily stressed. 
We should educate the cyber tactician to make regular checks for 
newly announced vulnerabilities, and be proactive in seeking and installing 
vendor patches as soon as they become available. The tactician should also 
be able to assess the added risk that any announced vulnerability presents, 
and be prepared to take other defensive measures until a patch is available. 
The measures might include a modified firewall rule-set, proxy isolation of 
the vulnerable service, or even removing the service from the network in 
extreme cases. 
Cyber tacticians should learn the value of redundancy for systems, 
services and power. They should be taught to assess an agency's high value 
data or service assets and be able to propose, design, and implement a 
redundant/failover configuration that enhances data and service 
survivability. 
We should teach our tacticians to do regular vulnerability assessments 
of their own systems, thereby taking a proactive role in identifying defensive 
weaknesses before an attacker does. 
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Cyber tactIcIans should be educated as experts in choosing and 
configuring firewalls and intrusion detection devices and software. They 
should learn the types of filtering (e.g., stateless, stateful, reflexive, proxy-
level, etc.), how to understand and build filter rule-sets, and how to interpret 
packet level information (e.g., TCP flags, TTL values, sequence numbers, 
etc.). These skills enable the tactician to read and understand network traffic 
logs, identify anomalies, and react to such anomalies with updated filter 
rules. 
Encryption technology is next on the agenda. Cyber tacticians should 
know the fundamentals and ramifications of such cryptological concepts as: 
block versus stream ciphers, chaining, key symmetry, key space, key 
management, hashing, and common protocols used to implement secure 
network transactions (e.g., ISAKMP, IKE, SSL, SSH, IPSec, PPTP, etc.). 
Cyber tacticians should be capable of configuring appropriately secure 
communication tunnels between any two protected systems. 
We should teach tacticians the art and science of post-incident 
computer forensics so that they can sift through the digital residue left in the 
wake of an attack. They should learn how information is stored and how it 
may be deliberately hidden or subverted. They should learn the tools and 
techniques of logging, disk examination, evidence recovery, and legal 
preparation. 
Finally, we should complete the cyber tactician's education with 
several practical cyber defense exercises. These exercises would entail the 
design, installation and configuration of a highly secured service network. 
This network would then be the target of attack by a team of cyber warrior 
graduates who would employ their knowledge and all available exploit tools 
to try and compromise the protected network. The earlier attacks can be 
escalatory in nature so that the defending students can more easily observe 
and learn. For example; the attackers would first engage exclusively in 
reconnaissance or discovery type activity (e.g., foot printing, port scanning, 
etc.), followed by surreptitious attacks intended to achieve unnoticed account 
access or observation of data, then attacks that modify data, and finally the 
more brutish denial of service category of attacks. Later exercises should be 
"free play" for the attackers while the cyber defenders must be on guard for 
anything. Attack/defend exercises such as this provide realistic scenarios that 
puts to practice the previously mentioned areas of cyber tactician education. 
The cyber tactician that has her network: 1) patched, 2) configured for least 
privilege, 3) scanned for vulnerabilities, 4) monitored by network and host-
based intrusion detection systems, 5) properly isolated with proxies and/or 
firewalls, 6) backed up, 7) redundantly configured, and is herself capable of 
8) forensic analysis; has vastly minimized her network's residual risk with 
sound defense-in-depth IA safeguards. 
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Students of IA at several of the Service Academies and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) have participated in two such large scale 
exercises since 2001 [5]. In these two exercises, the IA students at each 
school (Blue Teams) configured nearly identical service networks, and 
applied to these networks the security principles learned in their IA courses. 
A Red Team comprised of infonnation warfare professionals from the NSA, 
Air Force, and Anny, then attacked each network through a VPN tunnel for 
four consecutive days. Each Blue Team was graded based upon the 
resilience of its network to attack, and the accuracy of its daily situation 
reports which identified each day's attack activities, and the success or 
failure thereof. NPS was the high scoring Blue Team in both of these 
exercises. A third exercise is scheduled for April of 2003. 
3.2 Cyber Strategists 
As mentioned above, the focus of the cyber strategist is to reduce risk 
by reducing system vulnerabilities. By referring back to the risk management 
equation, we can see that a system with no vulnerabilities results in no risk, 
thereby negating the need for "after-the-fact" safeguards. The zero 
vulnerability system is the ideal pursued by cyber strategists, and 
achievement of this requires a much more theoretical skill set than that of the 
cyber tactician. So unlike the cyber tactician who builds a virtual protective 
wall around soft systems, the cyber strategist builds hard systems that need 
no wall. 
Cyber strategists must receive intense education in programming, 
programming languages, processor functionality, technical policy, and the 
mathematical skills necessary to understand, code, and fonnally model the 
behavior of computer code. This is because the cyber strategist's primary 
function is to oversee system and network design, development, integration 
and processor (hardware) functionality to ensure that they correctly 
implement a given security policy. 
Cyber strategists are taught that it is infeasible to attempt to design 
large general-purpose operating systems to be provably devoid of 
vulnerabilities due to the arduous and exacting nature of the fonnal methods 
methodology required. Instead, they are taught to consolidate all Reference 
Monitor implementing code into a relatively small software module that is 
referred to as the security kernel. Strategists must learn the tools and 
methods by which to ensure the kernel code adheres to three necessary 
attributes: complete, isolated, and verifiable. A complete kernel is one that is 
always invoked when any security sensitive access control decision is made. 
That is, it is proven that no artifice exists that might cause the kernel to miss 
or otherwise not arbitrate a subject to object access attempt. An isolated 
272 Training the Cyber Warrior 
kernel is one that cannot be subverted by any means. For example; booting 
off of a virus-infected disk, downloading a Trojan horse, or even a human 
attacker with user level system privilege should not be able to modify the 
operation of the kernel. A verifiable kernel is one that is small enough to 
have had every line of code fonnally proven to be correct. Since the security 
kernel is essentially considered the first and last line of defense, no chances 
are taken with its design. 
Cyber strategists should study existing systems that satisfy the 
requirements outlined above, and be presented with instructional security 
kernel fragments that test their ability to find flaws or prove correctness. 
Finally, we should teach the cyber strategists the process and 
methodology of perfonning Certification and Accreditation (C&A) so that 
they may utilize their analysis skills to not only oversee the design and 
development of new systems, but be able to assess the threats and residual 
risks associated with existing information processing sites, and be able to 
make an infonned yes/no accreditation decision. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The need for purposefully educated IA professionals is real, urgent, and 
not expected to abate in any foreseeable technological future. All enterprises 
with a stake in the protection of information and infonnation processing 
resources require a knowledgeable staff of cyber warriors to provide it. For 
maximum return on education investment, cyber warriors should receive 
extensive education in the following five courses: Discrete Mathematics, 
Computer Hardware/Architecture, Programming, Operating Systems, and 
Algorithms. They should receive inculcation in the core IA security 
principles; specifically, the Reference Monitor Concept, the Risk 
Management Equation, the Defense-in-depth concept, and the Principle of 
Least Privilege. Cyber warriors should then select to specialize as either 
cyber tacticians who focus on the application of safeguards to vulnerable 
systems, or cyber strategists who focus on the reduction of system 
vulnerabilities. Cyber tactician education will be steeped in: scanning, 
patching, least-privilege configuration, perimeter security with filtering, 
intrusion detection, backup/recovery technology, system/service 
redundancies, and forensics. Cyber tacticians should participate in several 
cyber defense exercises to put all of their skills to practical test. Cyber 
strategist education should be steeped in: formal methods analysis, 
programming, programming languages, and the tools of mathematical 
proofing. Cyber strategists should study the design and integration of secure 
systems and use this knowledge to design future secure systems. Cyber 
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strategists should also be educated as Accreditors, with a thorough 
understanding of the complete Certification and Accreditation process and 
methodology. 
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